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Below the Radar in a Big Society? Reflections on 
community engagement, empowerment and social action 
in a changing policy context 
 
„You can call it liberalism. You can call it empowerment, you can call it freedom, you can 
call it responsibility. I call it the Big Society‟ (Prime Minister David Cameron: 19th July 
2010). 
„Bottom-up and community-led activities which so often bubble along under the radar are 
receiving new public recognition. This is in part because we are on the threshold of 
political change and deep economic restraint…‟ (Oppenheim et al., 2010: 2). 
 
Abstract 
„The Big Society‟ has become a key element of the Coalition‟s Government policy platform, not only on 
the delivery of public services by the formal and funded voluntary sector but also in terms of 
communities, more informal third sector activities and individual citizens. Whilst the term itself is 
recent, and accompanied by the „new language‟ of social action, there are continuities between the 
current Coalition policy objectives and those of the previous New Labour administration: the devolution 
of powers to the local level, the reconfiguration of services and promotion of community engagement, 
empowerment and active citizenship. 
This working paper explores the debates about, „below the radar‟ (BTR) community groups and 
their assumed role in delivering „big society‟. It argues that the motivators for community action are, 
and have been, ill understood in policy circles. Further, there is and has been little systematic analysis 
of the power relationship between the state (both locally and nationally) communities and 
neighbourhoods which can inform meaningful debate on devolution and localism. The paper examines 
the implications of the „new‟ policy environment for small community groups and asks can such 
activity, which has often been independent of, and operated outside the state, be co-opted to deliver 
particular government policy objectives? 
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Big Society, empowerment, community engagement, social action, community groups, below the 
radar. 
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Introduction: defining ‘below the radar’ groups and activities 
The term „below, or under, the radar‟ (BTR) has become a short-hand term often applied to describe 
small voluntary organisations, community groups and more informal or semi-formal activities in the 
third sector. Interest in such activities (beyond the role of the formal voluntary sector in public service 
delivery) has grown in recent times and cuts across a wide range of current policy concerns: from the 
engagement of Black and Minority Ethnic community organisations in community cohesion agendas 
and combating extremism, through to supporting grass roots community economic development in 
excluded neighbourhoods as well as the involvement of community based organisations in 
modernising local governance, community safety and health planning and policy (McCabe et al., 
2010). The debate on these groups has been given a greater urgency with the change in Government 
in May 2010 and the introduction of the concept of the „Big Society‟ which aims to give below the radar 
groups a higher profile, and substantially greater role, in the delivery of Government policy agendas 
(DCLG, 2010a and 2010b; HM Government, 2010a and 2010b). 
The Office of the Third Sector (now the Office for Civil Society) recognises that „the phrase under 
the radar is ungainly‟ (OTS, 2008: 3) and that there is no precise definition of the term. For example 
MacGillivray et al. (2001) use the term BTR to refer to those groups or activities that are „unregulated‟ 
and do not appear in databases held by the Charity Commission, Companies House, the Regulator of 
Community Interest Companies or Guidestar. Other commentators note that even very small 
community based organisations will register with the Charity Commission but are „below the radar‟ 
because of very limited or uncertain incomes. For example, in a study of resilience in charities using 
an analysis of the Scottish Charity Register (McCrae and Nowak, 2010) found that 80% of 
organisations on the Register had incomes of less than £25,000 per annum and that the majority of 
these were „micro-groups‟ with annual turnovers of less than £2,000.  
There is, however, no consensus about the threshold of income that leaves activities under the 
financial radar. NCVO describes charities with incomes of less than £10,000 per annum as „micro 
charities‟ (Kane et al., 2009). Alternatively CEFET (2007) use an annual income of £35,000 to define 
„grass-roots or street level‟ organisations. Thompson (2008) identified two funding thresholds; 
organisations with funding less than £250,000, which are small, relative to the big childrens‟ charities; 
and „smaller‟ under the radar organisations with income of less than £50,000 per year.  
 In terms of measuring, or quantifying, the Third/Civil Society Sector there are now almost 171,000 
registered charities in the UK (Kane et al., 2009). Once we broaden the focus to the wider, „below the 
radar‟ community sector it becomes far more difficult to make any claims about the exact size of the 
sector though it is these groups which, numerically, represent the mass of activity below the tip of the 
iceberg of registered charities and social enterprises. MacGillivray et al. (2001) argue there are more 
than 900,000 micro-organisations in the UK. The New Economics Foundation estimate is between 
600,000 and 900,000 (cited in Kane et al., 2009) and NCVO itself estimates there are some 870,000 
„civil society‟ organisations whilst noting that the quality of data on informal community organisations is 
poor nationally and regionally (Community Research Centre, 2010).  
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Both the work of Chapman et al. (2009) in mapping the voluntary sector in the North East of 
England and the Office of the Third Sector sponsored local surveys on unregistered third sector 
organisations (Ipsos MORI, 2010) demonstrate the difficulties and resource-intensive nature, of „micro-
mapping‟ community groups accurately even at a highly localised level. Further, profiles of community 
action do not, as of yet, include or quantify virtual/on-line actions associated with new social 
movements (Della Porta and Diani, 1999; Smith and McCabe, 2009). 
If „below the radar‟ community organisations and activities form the majority of the third sector – 
(excluding „one off‟ voluntary activities and informal care and social support arrangements between 
individuals and families), it might be expected that these groups will be integral to the delivery of „Big 
Society‟ agendas both in terms of delivering/managing public services and in offering alternative, 
volunteer based, services at the community level. Yet is this the case? To what extent are the current 
expectations that Big Society will encourage community engagement and participation in the delivery 
of state policy based on research evidence on small community based activities. For, as Toepler 
(2003: 236) notes: „perhaps one of the few remaining big mysteries in non-profit sector research is the 
question of what we are missing by excluding those organisations from empirical investigations that 
are not easily captured in standard data sources.‟  
Where then, do below the radar community groups sit with „The Big Society‟ and can they deliver or 
will they remain, in the words of the Community Sector Coalition (undated) „Unseen, Unequal, 
Untapped‟? 
‘Big Society’ as policy: continuity and divergence 
In a Cabinet Office press release (5
th
 August 2010) on the „Big Society‟ The Communities Secretary. 
Eric Pickles, announced „Today we are turning Government upside down‟ by returning decision 
making to the local, „nano‟, level. At the same time, the Minister for the Cabinet Office argued „Big 
Society‟ was to be a radical departure from the previous Government‟s policies in that it was „a real 
cultural shift‟ and an end to „big Government, just tweaking things at the centre of power‟. 
Although „the Coalition Government‟s vision of the Big Society is not entirely clear‟ (Rowson et al., 
2010: 66), Oppenheim et al. (2010: 2) argue that the concept of „Big Society‟ taps into „a powerful 
tradition of mutualism, co-operatives and the social economy – a tradition which straddles different 
ideological standpoints‟. Certainly, elements of „The Big Society‟ have a long history within right wing 
political thinking, harking back to the idea of a pre-Welfare State golden age of mutualism (Whelan, 
1997) and the „search‟ for a „viable private, non-political alternative to the welfare state‟ (Green, 1996: 
V). There is also evidence of borrowing from Europe (Free Schools in Sweden) and America (Citizen 
Organising). However, there are also certain policy continuities between Coalition statements and the 
previous administration‟s agendas towards communities, their roles and responsibilities and 
relationship with Government. For example: 
 The transfer of public assets to community ownership or management, introduced in the Quirk 
Review (2007) remains a Coalition aspiration. 
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 Making budget decisions „at the street level„1 has similarities with participatory budget setting 
(CLG, 2008: 1) whilst the idea of returning power to local authorities communities can be related 
to New Labour‟s „double devolution‟ agenda and communities in control (CLG, 2008: 2). Indeed, 
the recent statements by the Communities Secretary and Minister for the Cabinet Office bear 
more than a passing resemblance to David Milliband‟s statement following a speech to the 
National Council of Voluntary Organisations that: “This new politics goes beyond structures and 
committees to policies that empower the individual citizen to take greater control of their lives” 
(The Guardian, 21
st
 February 2006). 
 A continued, if perhaps accelerated, emphasis on social enterprise as a mechanism for 
delivering public services. 
 Refreshing „The Compact‟ (Home Office, 1998) between Government and the voluntary and 
community sector (Conservative Party, 2008). 
 Building Britain‟s Future (HMG, 2009), argued that every young person should give „at least 50 
hours of service to their community in their teenage years….this will become a customary part 
of the growing up process for every young person.‟ More recently David Cameron and the 
Government have highlighted two months National Citizen Service as „…a programme for 
sixteen year olds to give them a chance to develop the skills needed to be active and 
responsible citizen‟. 
 The proposed Big Society Bank bears more than a passing resemblance to New Labour‟s 
Social Investment Bank and the community development finance initiatives from earlier in the 
last decade (BIS, 2010). 
 Transforming the civil service into a „civic service‟ by making regular community service a key 
element in civil servant staff appraisals can be related back to The Learning Curve (NRU, 2002) 
and a commitment to developing community informed skills and knowledge for civil servants 
involved in neighbourhood regeneration. 
Policy continuity can, however, be over-stated. There are also substantial discontinuities between 
New Labour‟s statements on community engagement and the „Big Society‟. Perhaps the most 
immediate has been the dismantling of one tier of devolved governance with the abolition of 
Government Offices for the Regions and the Regional Development Agencies. But there are also 
other shifts – some ironic. A key aim of „Big Society‟ is the end of „imposing top-down diktats from 
Whitehall‟.
2
 Yet, whilst much of the previous Government‟s policy towards communities had an 
element of voluntarism (in asset transfer, participatory budget setting etc) there is a language of 
„aspirational compulsion‟ in the Coalition‟s statements on Big Society „Creating more responsible and 
active communities where people play a part on making society a better place‟.
3
 There will be, for 
example, National Citizen Service for 16 year olds (a concept of prescriptive if not compulsory 
volunteering). There will be a new generation of 5,000 community organisers who will become self- 
funding. Public service workers will form „John Lewis style‟ partnerships, community groups and social 
enterprises and will run services that the state can no longer afford to provide. 
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The most substantial policy discontinuity, however, is likely to be in funding. Under New Labour, 
and indeed the previous Conservative administrations, the voluntary sector grew – at least in part 
through contracting and an increase in Government funding (Clark et al.: 2010). Whilst some care has 
been taken to separate out „Big Society‟ as a policy objective in its own right, it is inexorably linked to 
deficit reduction, and a target of around 25% savings in public spending across Departments, with the 
exceptions of health and international aid. This was made explicit in an open letter to the voluntary, 
community and social enterprise sectors by Ministers Nick Hurd and Francis Maude: 
„We have pledged to be as open and transparent as possible about how we are making 
savings. We are facing some of the most challenging economic times and every area of 
Government is looking at reducing costs and streamlining their work. The Office for Civil 
Society is no exception and I am committed to ensuring we are more efficient and 
effective than ever before and that our resources are focused on where they are needed 
most‟ (Cabinet Office 19
th
 July 2010: Open Letter to the voluntary, community and social 
enterprise sectors). 
It is possible to over-emphasise divergence here as the New Labour administration both 
emphasised the need for voluntary organisations to diversify their funding base to be less dependent 
on Government and, in its 2010 Election Manifesto, was also committed to unspecified budget 
reductions.  
The language of ‘Big Society’ 
The language surrounding communities and community activity that accompanies the concept of „Big 
Society‟ has also changed. This may seem a minor point given current deficit reduction strategies and 
their likely impact – but semantics are important and underpin not only messages about policy 
direction but also the values and principles which underpin policy.  
Some of this may be purely cosmetic or an attempt to create a language for „Big Society‟ which 
makes it a new idea and disassociates it from any possible continuities with the previous New Labour 
regime. So „pathfinders‟ have become „test-beds‟, „delivery‟ has become „implementation‟, „targets and 
outcomes‟ are „results and impact‟. Other shifts in terminology are, however, less cosmetic.  
Concepts of social justice have been replaced by the use of words such as „fair‟ or „fairness‟ 
alongside terms such as „liberation‟ and „freedom‟ - the co-option of the language of radical 
Catholicism and transformational community development in the African context (Hope and Timmel, 
1984) . However imperfectly defined, or associated imperfectly with „third way‟ politics and economics 
(Jordan, 2010) there is a substantial body of historical, economic, sociological, theological and social 
policy literature on concepts of social justice: a literature which relates directly to debates on equalities 
and social exclusion (Rawls, 1971; Atkinson, 1983; Craig et al., 2008). Concepts of fairness are much 
harder to define and therefore legislate for and may, actually, only be in the eye of the beholder rather 
than based on any rigorous social analysis. 
As social justice makes way to fairness, so to the language surrounding communities has changed 
with the „Big Society‟. This is not to suggest that there was a consistency in the language of New 
Labour. Participation, engagement and involvement were all terms applied to community (CLG, 2006) 
though often used inter-changeably to mean consultation. Indeed, as a contested concept (Hoggett, 
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1997) the term was at times replaced by the less contentious „neighbourhood‟: as in Neighbourhood 
Renewal and Working Neighbourhoods. 
The objectives of re-engaging citizens, involvement and participation were linked to a series of 
policy initiatives (from regeneration, through to community cohesion and „double devolution‟) at the 
core of which lay concerns about declining social capital (Putnam, 2000; Field, 2003), community 
decline and public disengagement from formal political processes. Community development became 
one instrument for delivering these social policy objective (CLG, 2006) and, in its practice, has been 
criticised for becoming co-opted by the state (Ledwith, 2005), adopted as „a means for sustaining the 
existing social order‟ (Cooper, 2008: 4) „vacuous, empty of political content‟ or analysis (Pearce et al., 
2010: 265) and far removed from its radical Freirean tradition (Freire, 1970). 
Yet, as the Power Report (2006, 16) noted: 
„Contrary to much of the public debate around political disengagement, the British public 
are not apathetic. There is now a great deal of research evidence to show that very large 
numbers of citizens are engaged in community and charity work outside of politics. There 
is also clear evidence that involvement in pressure politics – such as signing petitions, 
supporting consumer boycotts, joining campaign groups – has been growing significantly 
for many years. In addition, research shows that interest in „political issues‟ is high. The 
area of decline is in formal politics.‟ 
Other Power Inquiry papers (Smith, 2005) highlighted innovation in participatory and deliberative 
democracy „beyond the state‟: direct action, new social movements (Della Porta, 1999), social action, 
citizen organising and other spaces for autonomous debate and action. 
How far the Power Inquiry has influenced Coalition thinking on the „Big Society‟ may be debatable 
– but the move from a language of community engagement to one of social action may be significant. 
Social action has radical origins (Alinsky, 1971) and traditions. In its purest form it is about building 
movements and taking action. It does so without accepting funding from the state, whether local or 
national, as this involves compromise at the very least or agendas being driven by Government rather 
than communities and citizens (Minkler, 2005). In the US context citizen, or community organising has 
been able to retain this independence through Foundation funding and money from faith 
organisations, in particular the church. That financial basis is very different in the UK where this model 
is less embedded –though where it has been adopted it has become influential and maintained a 
tradition of direct action: for example London Citizen‟s campaigns on affordable housing (Our Homes, 
Our London) and asylum seekers and refugees (Strangers into Citizens). 
As, or if, citizen organising becomes the mainstream instrument to „mobilise people for a state 
project‟ (Pearce et al., 2010: 271) with the training of 5,000 community organisers it will be interesting 
to see whether this model of social action, like elements of community development practice, becomes 
co-opted by the state or whether citizen organising retains a radicalism which may inevitably bring it 
into conflict with Government. 
In summary, there is both continuity and divergence in New Labour and Coalition policy and 
language regarding communities and community groups. Continuity in the rhetoric of transferring 
power and decision making down to the local level and discontinuity in how best this can be achieved, 
the scope of change– and the speed at which it can be achieved. How then will „Big Society‟ impact on 
the third sector?  
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The impact of ‘Big Society’  
During US President Richard Nixon‟s visit to China in 1971, Chairman Zhou Enlai was asked what he 
felt the impact of the 1789 French Revolution had been. His response was „It is too early to tell‟. It is 
certainly too early to tell what the impact of „Big Society‟ will be on the voluntary and community 
sector. 
It is therefore only possible at this stage to pick up „early signs‟. Sector infrastructure bodies are 
particularly vulnerable. „Capacity building‟ organisations, Empowerment Partnerships and other 
voluntary sector regional structures which related to Government Offices are on the verge of 
disappearing as are a range of ring-fenced funding streams into which the sector could bid – Working 
Neighbourhoods and Future Jobs Funds for example. 
It is, as noted, too early to tell what the impact of „Big Society‟ and proposed cuts (or deficit 
reductions) will be on the voluntary and community sector in the medium to longer term. How these 
will interact with the effects of the recession and reductions in corporate and public giving has yet to 
be fully seen or understood. There may well be differential effects on those voluntary organisations 
which have become largely reliant on state funding and contracts and small BTR, self-financing 
volunteer based, community groups. Both, however, are faced with increased expectations of their 
role and pressures on their services and whilst the former organisations may be vulnerable with 
reductions in statutory sector spending nationally and locally, community groups may also be effected 
by, for example, the closure of community centres and the loss of „in kind‟ or below cost access to 
local authority premises and expertise. 
One early impact may have been the loss of solidarity or collective identity within, particularly, the 
formal and funded voluntary sector. The notion of a single, unified, third sector has always been fragile 
and contested (Alcock, 2010), given decades of competitive tendering and resource competition and 
more recently of mergers and acquisitions. However, the sector continues to argue that it operates 
from a different value base, which is not purely financial, to the private and statutory sectors which 
makes if different and unique. Whether this remains true, or tenable, in the face of increased 
competition for resources and the changing nature of voluntaries into „hybrid‟ organisations where 
private/community and statutory structures and functions become blurred (Billis, 2010) remains to be 
seen. 
As one representative of a national voluntary sector network organisation in a recent interview for 
the TSRC‟s „below the radar‟ research recently expressed: “A lot of voluntary organisations have seen 
the writing on the wall. They are now all desperately trying to make sure that writing is not on their 
particular wall.” 
Despite budgetary concerns, so far, the response of the Sector has been broadly, if cautiously, 
welcoming. „Big Society‟ is an opportunity for the expansion of the sector in the medium to longer term 
and where doubts have been expressed, particularly around the likely impact of deficit reduction 
strategies, this has been done so with caution (Chanan and Miller, 2010). 
Indeed, the most savage criticisms of „Big Society‟ have not been from third sector organisations 
but from the media, both that on the political right and the broad left. The Economist (22
nd
 July 2010) 
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dismisses it as „a baggy concept‟ which is „fanciful [in] its vision of a renaissance of voluntarism‟. 
Writing in The Guardian (6
th
 August 2010) Polly Toynbee goes further, referring to Big Society as a 
„big lie‟, commenting that „the idea that a sector that is just 2.3% of the workforce can replace the 
welfare state is not so much fanciful as downright dishonest.‟ In the Daily Telegraph (2
nd
 July 2010) 
Geoffrey Lean, laments the abolition of the Commission for Rural Communities as the loss of a voice 
to Government for the poorest in those communities and expresses a view that, ironically, „a coalition 
of two parties that traditionally represented the countryside is betraying it.‟ 
Beyond the media, there have been some criticisms that „The Big Society‟ is not ambitious enough 
and that the initiatives high-lighted in the four vanguard communities‟ (or more accurately Local 
Authority areas) of Liverpool, Windsor and Maidenhead, Sutton and Eden Valley in Cumbria are small 
scale. Proposals suggested to date for enacting the Big Society agenda in these areas have included 
delivering broadband, changing local transport systems, community ownership of pubs and post 
offices and volunteering programmes to keep local museums open for longer hours. For example, 
Coote (2010) writes that the scope of „Big Society‟ needs to be both wider and deeper than these 
proposed actions suggest: 
„We need to shift from our current unsustainable path, to a system where everyone is 
able to survive and thrive on equal terms, without over-stretching the earth‟s resources. 
This means changing how we live and work, relate to each other, organize our economy 
and society, and safeguard our environment….. Only with a transition on this scale can 
the best elements of the „Big Society‟ vision be realised and sustained over time.‟ 
What is evident, however, from even a summary review of recent both academic and practitioner 
writing on „The Big Society‟ is that much of this has focused on its impact on the formal voluntary 
sector and the delivery of public services rather than on informal or semi-formal community groups 
and activities. So where do, and have, „below the radar‟ groups fit within the continuing agendas of 
engagement, empowerment and, now, social action? 
‘Below the radar’: community engagement, empowerment and social action: 
critical issues 
In June 2010 the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Third Sector 
Partnership Board Task and Finish Group on Deprived Neighbourhoods produced a discussion paper 
and recommendations on the role of the voluntary and community sector in deprived neighbourhoods. 
This makes explicit reference to „below‟ or „under‟ the radar community groups, with recommendations 
in the executive summary (p. 4): 
„Developing the Big Society will be enhanced by: 
4) Development work on „below the radar organisations‟ which ensures greater visibility, 
connection and working with civil society organisations traditionally missed by local 
partnerships and programmes. 
5) A re-appraisal of existing VCS (Voluntary and Community Sector) policy to ensure 
greater relevance and inclusion of largely unfunded groups including wider civil society 
organisations‟. 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
This is a welcome recognition of the importance of small, community based, groups and activities 
which the paper goes on to identify as the largest part of the voluntary or third sector. 
These papers go on to argue for the „transformative role‟ of the voluntary and community sector in 
deprived neighbourhoods which „is virtually without limit‟ (Executive Summary, p. 6). This again is 
welcome in the recognition of the role of community activity and action in promoting community health, 
wellbeing and acting as the social glue which binds communities (Phillimore and McCabe, 2010). 
However, what is the evidence base that community groups have the capacity, or indeed willingness, 
to engage with the above agendas? 
In terms of levels of participation, there is a „glass half empty, glass half full‟ debate, depending on 
different perspectives. For example, from one view point: „Half the public do not actually want to be 
involved in decision-making in their local area. Even more – 55% – do not wish to be involved in 
decision-making in the country as a whole‟. (Ministry of Justice/Hansard Society, 2009: 36) Indeed, the 
Conservative Party manifesto on „Big Society Not Big Government‟ (2010), whilst aspiring to increase 
community action, notes that „volunteering levels have remained static since 2001 and only 3% of the 
population participate in civic society‟. 
In contrast, the 2009 Ipsos MORI Survey of Third Sector Organisations (2009) found that voluntary 
and community organisations did want to engage and that the key determinant in positive relationships 
between the sector and local/central government was the extent to which they could influence both 
local and national policy decisions. 
Similarly, there has been substantial debate on the perceived decline in civil society or social 
capital (Putnam, 2000). Yet, in its 2010 survey of volunteering, Communities and Local Government 
found that: 
„In 2008-09, 26 per cent of people in England participated in formal volunteering at least 
once a month. This represents a fall since 2005 when 29 per cent of people participated, 
although there was no statistically significant change relative to 2007-08 (27%). Thirty-
five per cent of people in England participated in informal volunteering at least once a 
month, a fall since 2005 when the figure was 37 per cent. Again, there was no change 
relative to 2007-08 (35%). 
If these statistics are interpreted negatively (e.g. 79% of the population do not volunteer) then there 
is a view that civil society is, if not in crisis, certainly static or in gradual decline. Further, the profile of 
volunteers is within the 35-64 age range, highly qualified, white and in (managerial) employment with a 
decline in participation in the 18-24 years age group (Pathways Through Participation, 2010). 
However, the data only applies to „formal volunteering‟ rather than the wealth of informal community 
activities which take place „below the radar‟ and in black and minority ethnic communities (Phillimore 
and McCabe, 2010). Further, the above figures look particularly robust when compared to data on 
public participation in the democratic process: 
„Eleven per cent of adults can be classified as „political activists‟, according to the Audit 
definition, i.e. in the last two or three years they have done at least three political activities 
from a list of eight…... Over half the public (51%) report not having done any of these 
activities, an increase of three points since last year. Compared to 37% who had made 
charitable donations‟ (Ministry of Justice/Hansard Society, 2009). 
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This decline in voting, membership of political parties, political parties across Europe has been 
seen as disillusionment with traditional representative democracy (Henderson and Vercseg, 2010). 
Yet, as the Power Report (2006) points out, there are healthy democratic spaces which continue to 
exist and thrive beyond those of the formal political parties. 
David Cameron has said that the Conservative Manifesto was “an invitation to join the government 
of Britain”
4
 The statistics question whether there may be enough willing to do so. It also begs the 
question of whether citizens, communities, have sufficient trust in traditional political systems to 
engage in those formal democratic processes. Indeed much of the emphasis in the „trust debate‟ at a 
grass roots, community, has been horizontal and related to cohesion debate and trust within and 
between communities. Less attention has been paid in formal policy, legislation and debates in terms 
of: 
 parallel issues of trust „vertically‟ – between citizen‟s, their Government and elected members;  
 the nature of democracy that communities can, or are willing to, engage with. Is it purely 
representative or deliberative democracy or does direct action and participatory democracy also 
have a legitimacy?  
 Further, as noted, this begs the question of whether citizens and communities want to join the 
Government, or at least the management of current state services, or whether they are best served by 
taking action outwith Government. Indeed in a recent speech to the Institute for Government (6 July 
2010) Lord Wei acknowledged in a speech that “Government is not very good at mobilising mass civic 
action.” 
This may be true if referring to Government‟s mobilisation of people to achieve a particular state 
agenda. Where Government (both national and local) has actually been extremely successful in 
galvanising community action is when it has angered people. In the last decade, such successes have 
included the establishment of the Countryside Alliance and the campaign against the banning of fox 
hunting, the anti-Iraq war demonstrations, anti-globalisation actions at the G8 and G20 Summits and 
most recently in the demonstrations against the abolition of the Education Maintenance Allowance and 
increases in student tuition fees. At the local level there are numerous examples of communities 
taking action on environmental issues and again, anger is a key motivator. Yet this is often an under-
recognised aspect of community motivations to participate. Systems for community engagement over 
the last decade, have stressed the value of „participation‟ or perhaps more accurately „consultation‟, 
but underplayed both the creative and potentially destructive aspects of these strategies in terms of 
generating tensions between the state and communities and indeed between communities. Rather, 
emphasis has been placed on models of consensus building which could be alternatively interpreted 
as mechanisms for conflict avoidance (YHEP, 2009).  
In terms of understanding community participation either in the double devolution of New Labour or 
the Coalition‟s „Big Society, there are two further political issues. 
 Firstly, there is, and has been, a lack of systematic analysis of power relationships. This may 
seem a strange statement given that the themes of trust in politics and power run through Building 
Britain‟s Future (2009) to statements on „Big Society‟. David Cameron (Fixing Broken Politics 26
th
 May 
2010), for example has argued that citizens and communities:  
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„See a world that is built to benefit powerful elites, and they feel a terrible but impotent 
anger. So we rage at our political system because we feel it is self-serving, not serving 
us. Pounded by forces outside their control, people feel increasingly powerless... 
deprived of opportunities to shape the world around them, and at the mercy of powerful 
elites that preside over them‟. 
Then, there are statements such as: „Only when people are given more power…can we achieve 
fairness and opportunity for all.‟ (Cabinet Office, 2010) or: „We will promote decentralisation and 
democratic engagement and we will end the era of top down government by giving new powers to 
local councils, communities, neighbourhoods and individuals‟ (HM Government, 2010a: 11). 
The emphasis then is on devolving power to the neighbourhood or „nano-level‟. Yet as David 
Cameron‟s speech implies, power, real power, is rarely given away but has to be seized (Gramsci: 
1929). Setting aside this ideological argument, the reality is that whilst communities can affect change, 
there are structural and global factors (from mass unemployment to the power of multi-national 
corporations and global warming) that cannot be easily solved at a nation state level, let alone a „nano‟ 
community level. 
Secondly, this concept of power at the neighbourhood or nano level raises questions about the 
role of the state itself. The implication behind „Big Society‟ is that by devolving power to communities 
and creating a „small state‟ this vertical trust between formal politics and citizens will somehow be 
restored. However, this avoids, or perhaps does not fully address, what the role of the state within, or 
in relationship to, civil society is, can or should be – and even less attention has been paid to the role 
of the private sector. Freedom in the World (2005) expressed concern that „small states‟ are often 
actually failing states lacking the power to maintain law and order. Then there are the arguments 
presented by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) that Governments have a central role in ensuring checks 
and balances within economic and social systems that reduce inequality and promote healthier, more 
prosperous yet equal societies. Further, writing in the Guardian (20
th
 July 2010) Anne Coote, Head of 
Social Policy at the New Economics Foundation, warns: 
„We do need a state that is democratically controlled, and that enables everyone to play a 
part and acts as an effective mediator and protector of our shared interests. Democratic 
government is the only effective vehicle for ensuring that resources are fairly distributed, 
both across the population and between individuals and groups at local levels. 
Businesses or third-sector organisations can supplement these functions but cannot 
replace them, not least because they invariably serve sectoral or specialised interests, 
rather than those of the nation as a whole. If the state is pruned so drastically that it is 
neither big enough nor strong enough to carry them out, the effect will be a more troubled 
and diminished society, not a bigger one.‟ 
Beyond a debate on the role of governments in civil society, there is, and has been, an underlying 
assumption (which also underpinned much of New Labour‟s policies) in the „Big Society‟ that all 
community engagement, all social action is good. Community groups can be „autonomous, 
empowered and dynamic‟ but may also be (seen from a different perspective) „dissenting, resistant, 
dysfunctional and destructive‟
5
 or indeed oppressive, as can be seen by the co-option of community 
development by the Far Right. 
The lack of acknowledgement of anger as a motivator for social action and the lack of a systemic 
analysis of power and the role of the state in civil society present real challenges to the concept of the 
„Big Society‟. Yet there may be other, much more personal, barriers to making the aspirations of „Big 
Society into reality.  
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Whilst there is a body of literature on what motivates formal volunteering (Davis Smith, 1998; 
Locke, 2008) the drivers for community engagement are not well understood at a policy level, – nor is 
„enough known about the skills and support citizens need [to be active]. This is particularly true for 
hard to reach groups which are currently least likely to be engaged‟ (Rogers and Robinson, 2004: 7).  
Civic duty may be one factor, but in a recent i-Poll by I-Volunteer
6
 80% of respondents cited their 
reasons for volunteering as helping them to be happy (42%) and connected (38%). As an on-line poll, 
this may be an un-scientific, or unrepresentative, sample of volunteers. However a major factor in 
being active in a community is social – to meet people, feel connected and fun (Phillimore and 
McCabe, 2010). This is not to celebrate, rather than minimise, the value of community based social 
activity. It is something wider and deeper than „volunteering as serious leisure‟ (Rochester et al., 2009: 
13) and the organisation of sporting activities. It is about the basic social needs of humans to interact. 
Clubs, societies, village fetes etc all make significant contributions to social cohesion as well as to 
combating isolation and promoting health and mental wellbeing. These are all Government agendas 
(both now and in the recent past) but this is not why those groups exist. They are there to meet basic 
human needs, not deliver on policy agendas. This can be seen either as a weakness in community 
based activity – or as a celebration of the independence of civil society and its motivators from the 
state and raises the question – can such activities be co-opted into delivering the „Big Society‟? 
Some have suggested not. Work pressures, or the pressure simply to survive, may be one factor: 
„In short, long hours and low wages undermine a key premise of the „Big Society‟, which 
is that social and financial gains will come from replacing paid with unpaid labour‟ (Coote, 
2010: 4). 
A second may be the tensions or divisions between work-life and volunteering at a grass roots 
level. People are looking for something qualitatively different in their community activity from the 
demands, pressures and duties of work - particularly in a recession and increasing uncertainty in the 
job market. They may not wish to be treated as an 'employee', nor carry the burden of responsibility 
implied, for example, by being a trustee, managing a community asset or running the local school.  
Conclusions 
The Carnegie UK Trust Commission of Enquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland 
(2010: 3) commented: 
„Civil society activity meets fundamental human wants and needs, and provides an 
expression for hopes and aspirations. It reaches parts of our lives and souls that are 
beyond the state and business. It takes much of what we care about most in our private 
lives and gives it shape and structure. Helping us amplify care, compassion and hope.‟ 
This may be the most substantial challenge to the implementation of the „Big Society‟ as a policy 
concept. Whilst various commentators note that there is a lack of detail in „The Big Society‟ which 
contrasts to New Labour approaches
7
, it is: 
 on the one hand certainly, aspirational with the aim „to create the UK‟s biggest mutual to which 
all citizens will be able to belong‟;
8
 
 on the other hand, Oppenheim et al. (2010, 4) warn „simply rolling back the state and expecting 
communities to leap into the driving seat will not be the answer‟ whilst Chanan and Miller (2010) 
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note that ironically, in the forth-coming austerity, investment will be required in training and 
development work if „Big Society‟ goals are to be achieved. 
Others argue that „voluntary action must be funded for its own sake and for the sake of 
communities, not just as a means of achieving Government targets‟ (NCVO, 2010: un-numbered 
page). Bacon et al., writing for the Young Foundation (2010) note that governments of whatever shade 
have not, and are not, best equipped to understand and support wellbeing in communities and, with a 
tendency towards „discreet silos of service‟ (Sampson and Weaver, 2010: 1) are ill-suited to meeting 
community needs holistically or flexibly. 
This last point may well be an argument for the devolution of power and service delivery to 
communities where there can be a more detailed knowledge of community needs and holistic 
responses to those needs (Phillimore and McCabe, 2010). Certainly there is a weight of expectation 
HM Government, 2010: 2) on what the „Big Society‟ can deliver; not only „more for less‟ but also: 
 the restoration of faith in political systems; 
 empowered and active citizens and communities; 
 decision making based on real local knowledge and expertise; 
 more flexible and cost efficient services; 
 greater equality and „fairness‟. 
Yet the lack of systematic analysis or evidence base to underpin the „Big Society‟ presents a real 
challenge to this becoming a policy reality. Firstly, looking at the range and diversity of „below the 
radar‟ activity, we already have a big society. Just not one that is, or wants necessarily to engage with 
government or „scale up‟ to managing public services. What motivates grass roots, informal and semi-
formal, community activity is little understood in policy circles and Picardian exhortations that 
communities should „make it so‟ in building a political reality of Big Society may therefore be unlikely to 
succeed. 
But there are perhaps two, even more substantive challenges. Firstly, will community trust in 
politics be restored if „Big Society‟ becomes inexorably linked in the public mind with „deficit reduction‟, 
the delivery of services „on the cheap‟ and the rolling back of the welfare state to a residual role where 
consumers with resources have more access to quality choices whilst services for the poor become 
poor services? Secondly, can a policy which appears to lack a systemic analysis of power and the role 
of the state in relation to civil society, really deliver equality or fairness? The views of Henry Tam 
(2010: 121), reflecting on power, inequality and equality are timely in the current debates: 
„Resistance to progressive reforms, at the local, national and global levels, will 
undoubtedly persist. Short-term concessions from the powerful should not be mistaken 
for lasting achievements. Where arbitrary power can still be exercised by the rich over the 
poor, bosses over workers, parents over their children, men over women, wardens over 
inmates, superpowers over small countries, one ethnic group over another, the weaker 
groups will remain at the mercy of the strong, and routinely suffer as a result of their 
malice or misjudgement. So long as such iniquities exist, the struggle for inclusive 
communities will continue‟. 
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Next steps 
An early version of the current Working Paper was presented to the Third Sector Research Centre‟s 
„Below the Radar‟ Reference Group to identify the challenges presented by „Big Society‟ for 
communities, practitioners and policy makers as well as to inform next steps in research with small 
community groups and activities.
9
 
Echoing Tam‟s commentary (above, 2010), participant‟s major concerns around the current 
direction of the Big Society were that this agenda could exacerbate current inequalities by favouring 
strong communities with the resources, skills and knowledge to engage at the cost of the voice of the 
disempowered. Further questions were raised on who „owns‟ Big Society? Is it a bottom up process 
with communities in control or a top down directive, linked in the minds of the public, to cuts in public 
services? In an environment where infra-structure support for both the voluntary and community sector 
is vulnerable, and earlier capacity building programmes had been criticised as an ineffectual 
investment (NAO, 2009), how best could community engagement and action be developed? Indeed, 
would citizens and communities „scale up‟ to meet the challenge of delivering on a central Government 
agenda? 
It is these areas of research that the TSRC „Below the Radar‟ work-stream will be focusing on in 
the coming months. Firstly, one year on, what has been the impact of current policy and communities, 
community networks and infra-structure groups? Secondly, if „traditional‟ approaches to building 
community capacity have been seen as mechanistic, highly formal and inappropriate for small 
community groups, how are skills, knowledge and resources gained and shared in below the radar 
groups. The aim is to critically inform policy and practice in this time of rapid change for communities 
and those that work with „below the radar‟ community groups. 
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